

Message Text

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 00798 151557Z

41

ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-14 PM-03 SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05

CIAE-00 L-01 OMB-01 IGA-01 MC-01 ACDA-10 /051 W

----- 103507

R 141522Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6963

SECDEF WASHDC

USDEPCINCEUR

S E C R E T AMMAN 0798

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS,JO,US

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR U.S. - JORDANIAN JOINT MILITARY

COMMISSION MEETINGS

REF: STATE 031005 (DTG 080129Z FEB 76)

1 WE APPRECIATE STATE/DOD ENDORSEMENT IN REFTEL
OF OUR PROPOSAL SUGGESTING U.S. TEAM OF EXPERTS TO JORDAN.
WE HAVE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS ON REFTEL.

2. SURFACING THE U.S. TEAM OF EXPERTS AT THE JMC
MEETING WILL BE FINE, PROVIDING THE EMPHASIS IS ON
IT BEING AN OFFER TO ASSIST BASED ON KNOWN U.S.
CAPABILITIES IN THE FIELD OF FORCE PLANNING. WHAT
WE MUST DO IS CONVINCE JORDANIANS OF WHAT WE CAN
DO FOR THEM BY PROVIDING ACROSS-THE-BOARD EXPERTISE
THAT THEY LACK. THIS CAN PROBABLY BE INITIATED BY SOME
DISCREET QUESTIONING AFTER THEIR PRESENTATIONS WHICH
WOULD INDIRECTLY AND VERY CAREFULLY POINT UP ANY
INADEQUACIES OF THE STUDY AND PUT IN THEIR MIND THE IDEA
OF THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL AID TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOALS.
THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO SHOW THEM THEIR NEEDS AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00798 151557Z

SHORTCOMINGS IN THE FIELD OF MANPOWER,FISCAL AND

WEAPONRY PLANNING FOLLOWIED BY A MOST KIND, COST-FREE
OFFER TO PROVIDE THE AID OF THE GROUP OF US EXPERTS.
UNLESS THEY TRULY WANT THE TEAM, THE WHOLE EXERCISE
IS DOOMED TO FAILURE, EITHER BY FLAT REFUSAL OR BY A
JORDANIAN WHITEWASH WHILE LATER STUDY IS BEING CONDUCTED.
WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THE REAL BENEFIT TO THEM OF A STUDY.
THAT PRINCIPLE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT.

3. AS DEPT AND DOD ARE AWARE, THE WHOLE ATMSOPHERE
AT THE TIME OF THE OFFER IS KEY. A GREAT DEAL WILL
DEPEND UPON THE SINCERTIY OF THE U.S. CHAIRMAN WHO
SHOULD NOT USE THE OFFER AS A MEANS OF HOLDING UP ON
WEAPONRY DECISIONS,BUT WHO SHOULD MAKE THE OFFER
TO ASSIST THE JORDANIANS IN REACHING THEIR OWN
DECISIONS ON WHAT TO ACQUIRE. WE STILL HAVE CONFIDENCE
THAT THE JORDANIANS FROM THE KING ON DOWN DO NOT REALLY WANT
NEW WEAPONRY AND FACILITIES THAT THEY CANNOT ADEQUATELY
HANDLE. THEY HAVE PROBLEMS AND THEY KNOW IT, BUT THEIR
PERCEPTIONS ARE VAGUE AND INADEQUATELY PUT TOGETHER,
AND THAT IS WHERE WE MUST COME IN. THE JORDANIANS
WILL QUICKLY PERCEIVE THE TEAM OFFER AS A HOLDBACK,
STALL GIMMICK UNLESS WE PROJECT CONFIDENCE IN THEIR
ABILITY TO MAKE RATIONAL MILITARY DECISIONS -- WHICH WE
THINK IS STILL THE CASE ONCE THEY KNOW ALL THE FACTS
AND LIKELY CONSEQUENCES.

4. AT PRESENT WE ARE IN PROCESS OF MAKING A RECOMMENDA-
TION TO CINC BIN SHAKER THAT HE MAKE A 45-MINUTE PRE-
SENTATION ON OPENING DAY OF JMC COVERING JAF'S PLANS
AND CAPABILITIES COMPARED TO LAST YEARS' REORGANIZATION
PLAN, WHICH NEVER OCCURRED. (THIS WILL
OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE BASED ON SOME SORT OF STUDY OF
THEIR OWN.) WE ARE ALSO SUGGESTING THAT THIS BE
FOLLOWED UP BY SEPARATE, MORE DETAILED JAA/RJAF
PRESENTATIONS IN THE ACTION OFFICER LEVEL SESSIONS.
IF HE COMMITS JAF TO THIS SUGGESTION, IT WOULD BE
LOCICAL THAT FOR THE U.S. CHAIRMAN TO STATE THAT HE HAS CONSIDERED
THE SITUATION AND UNDERTAKEN THE NECESSARY COORDINATION
TO MAKE A GENEROUS OFFER OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE. THIS SHOULD BE
DONE AT NEXT PLENARY SESSION AFTER THE JORDANIAN PRESENTATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00798 151557Z

IF WE MAKE THE OFFER TOO QUICKLY AT THE CONCLUSION OF JAF'S
INITIAL PRESENTATION, THEY WILL RAPIDLY PERCEIVE THEY HAVE BEEN
"SET UP." THE RESULT WOULD DESTROY THE EFFECTIVENESS IN
AMMAN OF MY PRESENT MILITARY STAFF FOR A LONG
TIME TO COME.

5. WHEN THE SUGGESTION OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE IS MADE,
WE WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT COL. CLINT GRANGER

(CURRENTLY WE BELIEVE ON NSC STAFF) BE OFFERED TO HEAD THE TEAM. HE IS WELL KNOWN AND HIGHLY RESPECTED BY JAF AND THE CINC PERSONALLY, HAVING BEEN THE MAJOR FIGURE IN THE TWO PRIOR STUDIES. IT WOULD GO A LONG WAY IN IMPROVING ACCEPTABILITY OF THE OFFER BECAUSE, EVEN IF THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS, THEY MAY CONCLUDE THEY WILL GET A BETTER-THAN-FAIR SHAKE FROM HIM. WE HOPE HE CAN BE SPARED FOR THE TIME NECESSARY TO HEAD UP THIS EFFORT.

6. THEREAFTER, MY DATT, COL. MANN, WILL BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CINC TO GET HIS PRIVATE REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL. IF IT HASN'T WORKED, WE WILL KNOW IT QUICKLY AND CAN EASE BACK AS APPROPRIATE. COL. MANN FULLY UNDERSTANDS OUR POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN AND WILL KNOW JORDANIAN REACTIONS ACCURATELY AS MATTERS MOVE ALONG.

7. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED A LENGTHY LETTER TO BIN SHAKER REGARDING THE JMC MEETINGS AND BASED ON OUR TELEGRAM EXCHANGES. WHEN HE RESPONDS, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY PASS ON HIS REACTIONS. WE HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION TO FERRET OUT THEIR INITIAL POSITION ON FY 76 AND 77 WEAPONRY, AS WELL AS ON KEY CRUNCH ITEMS, I.E., HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS, COBRAS, ETC. WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR HANG-UPS REGARDING ANY OF JAF'S KNOWN WEAPONRY INTEREST--THE KEY FOR US IS NOT SO MUCH NUMBERS AS THE TIMING OF DELIVERIES. AS LONG AS DELIVERIES ARE STRETCHED OUT OVER A TIME PERIOD IN WHICH JAF CAN ADEQUATELY ABSORB THEM, WE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO WITHHOLD THE RELEASE OR CAREFULLY-PACED DELIVERY OF WEAPONRY, PARTICULARLY AS JAF PERCEIVES THE CAPABILITY GAP WIDENING BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR NEIGHBORS. WE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 00798 151557Z

WOULD THEREFORE QUALIFY THE PERCEPTION INHERENT IN THE DETAILED RATIONALE PROVIDED IN PARA 3 REFTEL REGARDING ADVERSE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF JAF ACQUIRING OVERABUNDANCE OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY. WE THINK POLITICAL STRAINS ARE JUST AS LIKELY TO COME FROM THE OTHER DIRECTION (DOING TOO LITTLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES) AND AGREE WE SHOULD KEEP A CAREFUL EYE ON BOTH OVERARMING AND UNDERARMING. WE WOULD WITHHOLD ANY JUDGEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACT, AS SURFACED IN PARA 3 REFTEL, PENDING FURTHER STUDY.

8. REGARDING SUGGESTION PARA 5 REFTEL, WE STRONGLY DOUBT THAT WE CAN SO TIGHTLY LINK WEAPONRY AND THE TEAM STUDY AND STILL PROCEED WITH USJMC MEETING

THAT WILL PERMIT ANY MEANINGFUL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. IN GENERAL WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FY 76 GA AND FMS BE FINALIZED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF FUNDS AVAILABLE AND PROCUREMENT LEAD TIMES. BETWEEN THE TWO LIMITING FACTORS, WE BELIEVE JAF WILL BE ABLE TO ABSORB ALL ITEMS, BUT WE RESERVE FINAL JUDGMENT PENDING SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL JAF LIST WHICH IS EXPECTED SHORTLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, FY 77 LISTS REQUIRE NO SOLID COMMITMENTS, AND DIFFICULT ITEMS, INCLUDING NUMBERS, CAN MORE REASONABLY BE LINKED TO FURTHER STUDY ON ABSORPTIVE CAPABILITY. OF COURSE DIFFICULT ISSUES WILL BE COBRAS AND HEAVY-LIFT HELOS (FUNDING SOURCE OF BOTH PRESENTLY UNKNOWN). WE KNOW THAT RJAF WILL STRESS ITS INTENTION TO SELL 12 ALOUETTES TO GARNER SOME OF THE TECHCICAL MANPOWER REQUIRED. THESE TWO ITEMS ARE PROBABLY THE PRIME EXAMPLE OF TIMING OF DELIVERIES BEING MORE IMPORTANT THAT ACTUAL NUMBERS.

9. I CANNOT HELP BUT NOTICE AND APPRECIATE THE THOUGHTFUL AND DETAILED CONSIDERATION THAT IS GOING INTO PREPARATIONS FOR THIS YEAR'S JMC MEETINGS. IT SHOULD RESULT IN FAR LESS AGONIZING FOR EVERYONE IN MID-MARCH, PROVIDING OUR APPROACH AND POSITION REMAINS REASONABLE AND FULLY COORDINATED. I ALSO SUGGEST THAT DOD PLENARY SESSIONS BE KEPT AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 AMMAN 00798 151557Z

THAT ANY UNSETTLING ADVERSE USG POSITIONS BE COMMUNICATED TO BIN SHAKER IN PRIVATE MEETINGS PRIOR TO LARGER PLENARY SESSIONS. JORDANIANS HAVE REACTED NEGATIVELY TO SURPRISES IN PLENARY SESSIONS IN THE PAST, AND WE HOPE WE CAN BE AWARE OF THEIR SENSITIVITIES IN THIS REGARD AT FORTHCOMING JMC.

10. MISSION WILL SUBMIT BY SEPTL RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC ITEMS WE EXPECT TO COME UP AT JMC.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, COMMITTEE MEETINGS, CONSULTANTS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976AMMAN00798
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760058-0261
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760248/aaaabpsf.tel
Line Count: 211
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 76 STATE 31005
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 JAN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <29 JAN 2004 by morefirh>; APPROVED <07 OCT 2004 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PREPARATIONS FOR U.S. - JORDANIAN JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION MEETINS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, US
To: STATE CINCEUR
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006